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Abstract 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems which control Australia’s critical infrastructure 
are currently demonstrating signs of vulnerabilities as they are being interconnected to corporate networks, 
essentially exposing them to malicious threats. This paper discusses the vulnerabilities associated with SCADA 
systems, as well as discussing various SCADA standards and initiatives that have been developed in recent 
years to mitigate such threats. The paper presents the requirement for a holistic SCADA security standard that 
is practical and feasible for each SCADA industry sector.  
Keywords SCADA, Vulnerability, Critical Infrastructure, Standards  
INTRODUCTION   
SCADA systems are currently facing vulnerabilities as they are becoming more increasingly connected to the 
Internet. This has caused organisations to develop security measures in order to secure their SCADA systems 
from internal and external security threats. SCADA systems are used for remote monitoring and control in the 
delivery of essential service products such as electricity, natural gas, water, waste treatment and transportation. 
They enable remote monitoring and control of a variety of industrial devices as diverse as water and gas pumps, 
track switches and traffic signals (IT Security Expert Advisory Group, 2005).  
SCADA networks provide great efficiency to industry sectors that run critical infrastructure; however they also 
present a security risk. They were initially designed to provide functionality including performance, reliability, 
flexibility and control. Presently, SCADA systems are vulnerable to disruption of service, process re-direction 
or manipulation of operational data that could result in public safety concerns (US Department of Energy, 
2002). These systems have become a concern to utilities within the industrial sector as they are playing a crucial 
role in their performance, reliability and productivity. However, this dependence has exposed these 
infrastructures to new threats of cyber-attack. This suggests that there is a need and a requirement for a holistic 
SCADA security standard in order to address the current vulnerabilities associated with SCADA systems. This 
standard needs to be practical and useful and shall provide organisations with comprehensive set of security 
guidelines that is systematic and fluid and that is easily adaptable to each SCADA industry sector.     
SCADA SYSTEMS OVERVIEW 
SCADA systems are primarily software tool kits for building industrial control systems.  These systems are 
often used for remote monitoring and sending commands to valves and switches. For example, they can be 
found in water utilities and oil pipelines where they monitor flow rates and pressures. Based on the data that 
these systems provide, computer programs or operators at a central control centre balance the flow of material 
using industrial control systems to activate valves and regulators. These systems are vulnerable to implantation 
of faulty data and to remote access through dial up modems used for maintenance (Shea, 2003).     
SCADA security risks have intensified since the development of Information Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) and the growth of terrorist organisations. Currently, SCADA systems are vulnerable to insiders, terrorists 
and malicious hackers. These risks and vulnerabilities have arisen because of system development on open 
based communications standards like Ethernet Communications and web enabled screens. SCADA software 
companies have embraced the Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and Ethernet 
communications as a common channel transfer information and data and to improve integration across multiple 
systems. However, these developments have exposed the industrial sector to common Internet vulnerabilities 
within communication protocols, which increase the risk of attack (Pollet, 2002). It is important to acknowledge 
that many of these protocols designed for SCADA can be easily attacked as they were not designed with 
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security in mind. Some of the existing SCADA hardware uses electronic chips that do not even have the 
computing power to encrypt the transmission for security (Mays, 2004).  
Also, many old legacy SCADA systems are not compliant with new security technologies such as advanced 
encryption and intrusion detection devices. This is one of the reasons why SCADA vulnerabilities are appearing 
in critical infrastructure systems, but more importantly, highlights that SCADA systems were not originally 
designed to be used on open networks such as the Internet.  
Public exposure of SCADA manuals and documents has also added to this risk of attack. Pollet (2002, p.1) 
claims that over 90% of major SCADA and automation vendors have all their manuals and specifications 
available online. Subsequently, Pollet argues that we are now at a time “when the technical knowledge and 
motivation are beginning to meet.” Hacker communities now have the knowledge, tool sets and abilities to 
conduct destruction via a computer and it is possible that at some stage they could be approached by terrorists to 
engage in cyber crime, including cyber-terrorism, for an appropriate amount of money. This over exposure is 
obviously making SCADA systems more vulnerable to attack as hacking groups or terrorist groups can study 
and understand these systems and their weaknesses.  
Many of Australia’s critical infrastructures are controlled by industrial control systems. These systems can 
include distributed control systems (DCS) and programmable logic controllers (PLC) as well as SCADA 
systems. DCS are process control systems where hardware and software components are often provided by a 
single vendor. These process control systems are commonly deployed in a single manufacturing or production 
complex, and perform a higher level of internal data processing. DCS generally provide processed information 
to or a series of commands from a control center.  For example, within a chemical plant a DCS might 
simultaneously monitor the temperature of a series of reactors and control the rate at which reactants were 
mixed together, while performing real time process optimisation and reporting the progress of the reaction. 
PLCs are devices used to automate monitoring and control of industrial plants and are generally used within a 
manufacturing plant (Shea, 2003). 
All of these industrial control systems DCS, PLC and SCADA systems are employed in many of Australia’s 
critical infrastructures. They were previously viewed as secure systems which protected remote locations from 
being physically broken into and damaged.  For example, the establishment of remote control systems in dams 
was believed to protect against the unlawful release of the dammed water, as no hand operable valves and 
switches were accessible (Shea 2003). However, industrial control systems such as SCADA systems are 
becoming linked to corporate computer systems, potentially making them vulnerable to cyber-attack through the 
Internet (Shea, 2003).  
 
 
COMMON VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS IN SCADA SYSTEMS  
A recent assessment conducted by the Fink et al. (2006), part of the US National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) a 
program created by the US Department of Energy to identify key vulnerabilities within control systems such as 
SCADA was carried out in 2006. The program involved the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) who is part of the 
NSTB to perform security reviews and assessments on a range of different sized controls systems including 
large SCADA systems with complex networks. The study involved over ten assessments which identified 
categories of vulnerabilities these are discussed below in Table 1.1 
 
 
Table 1.1 SCADA Vulnerabilities Identified from NSTB Assessment 
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Category Description 
Clear Text Communications Clear text (unencrypted) communications were observed in 
the network traffic (through packet sniffing). The clear text 
revealed user names and passwords which might permit 
replay attacks or simplify the process for reverse 
engineering of the data protocol. In some cases, clear text 
communications were observed between the control system 
network and the external corporate network segments.  
Account Management  Privileged accounts were found with default or easily 
guessed user names and passwords; hard coded usernames 
and passwords were defined in documentation or extracted 
from binary executables or configuration files; password 
protection policies were weak.  
Weak or No Authentication  Little or no authentication of host to host communications, 
increasing the vulnerability of the system to impersonation, 
replay, or man in the middle attacks.  
Coding Practices Disassembly or de-compilation of executable code revealed 
potentially unsafe coding styles (particularly with respect to 
string handling and buffer management); applications 
vulnerable to crashing on deliberately malicious input.  
Unused Services Services with known vulnerabilities were running on hosts; 
need for the service was not apparent in the system 
architecture.  
Network Addressing  Network address resolution protocols (DNS, etc) were 
exploitable by spoofing or other bypassing schemes.  
Scripting and Interface Programming  Batch files and other script files (Perl, etc) could be 
exploited with malicious input or other techniques.  
Un-patched Components  Software modules were not current versions and contained 
known exploitable vulnerabilities that were required by the 
configuration.  
Web Servers and Clients Web servers were not securely configured, allowing 
directory traversal or file modification.  
Perimeter Protection  Connections initiated from outside the SCADA perimeter; 
firewalls had unnecessary open ports; access control lists 
were mis-configured. 
Enumeration Web servers and other networks services revealed version 
information that could be use by an attacker. 
 
(Fink et al. 2006) 
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These vulnerabilities discovered by Fink et al. and the NSTB program in 2006 indicate the dangers that control 
systems such as SCADA are currently facing since the convergence of these systems with Internet. Other studies 
recently carried out on SCADA systems of large water utilities found other common similar vulnerabilities like 
NSTB program which included:  
• Operator station logged on all the time even when the operator is not present at the work  station, 
thereby restricting the authentication process; 
• Physical access to the SCADA equipment was relatively easy; 
• Unprotected SCADA network access from remote locations via Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) and/ or 
dial up modem lines; 
• Insecure wireless access points on the network; 
• Most of the SCADA networks directly or indirectly connected to the Internet; 
• No Firewall installed or the firewall configuration or weak or unverified; 
• System event logs not monitored;  
• Intrusion Detection Systems not used; 
• Operating and SCADA system software patches not routinely applied; 
• Network and router configuration insecure; passwords not changed from manufacturer’s default. 
(Mays, 2004, p.5.8) 
These vulnerabilities have been the cause of many security issues associated with ICT. Some of these issues are 
noted below:  
• Increasing reliance on public telecommunications networks to link previously separate SCADA 
systems is making them more accessible to electronic attacks;  
• Increasing use of published open standards and protocols in particular, Internet technologies, expose 
SCADA systems to Internet vulnerabilities; 
• The interconnection of SCADA systems with corporate networks may make then accessible to 
undesirable entities; 
• Lack of mechanisms in many SCADA systems which provide confidentiality of communications 
means that intercepted communications may be easily read; 
• Lack of authentication in many SCADA systems may result in a system user’s identity not being 
accurately confirmed. 
(IT Security Expert Advisory Group, 2005)   
The lack of security design and configuration with these systems seems to be a trend with the vulnerabilities 
identified within this discussion. These issues need to be considered when designing and configuring controls 
systems networks and need to be addressed in order to reduce control system vulnerabilities. The studies 
discussed above demonstrate further the need for new standards for SCADA protection.  
OVERSEAS SCADA STANDARDS 
There have been a number of SCADA standards that have been developed and released throughout the world in 
recent years in order to address SCADA vulnerabilities.  In 1999, the Gas Technology Institute (GTI) was 
awarded a contract by the Technical Support Working Group to identify encryption algorithms that would 
protect gas SCADA systems from cyber-attack. GTI discovered an approach that was to incorporate Digital 
Encryption Standard (DES) and Public Key Encryption (PKI) and the Diffie-Hillman number generating 
algorithm as a suite of algorithms to protect SCADA units. At the time, it was found that these algorithms could 
be used but at a very high cost. GTI demonstrated this work, but few gas utilities were interested as they did not 
want to include security in their SCADA systems (Mays, 2004). Since September 11 2001, this has changed and 
most utilities are now interested in using these standards to protect their SCADA networks and have started to 
explore the integration process of using such technologies on their SCADA systems. However, many 
organisations using old legacy SCADA systems have found difficulties in applying such technologies because 
of the overhead processing time on low bandwidth serial communications, causing sluggish real time control 
and acquisition which has been a problem when trying to secure legacy SCADA systems with inadequate 
technologies.   
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
8 
 
Likewise, other initiatives that have been formulated to improve SCADA systems security have been developed 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) who have an ongoing initiative to improve critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) by developing standards for process control security. They have established a 
process control security requirement forum for users of process control systems such as SCADA (Mays, 2004). 
NIST has launched a System Protection Profile for Industrial Control Systems addressing information system 
security certification and accreditation for federal governments. In 2007, NIST developed another Guide to 
Industrial Control Systems Security (SP 800-82) which provides guidance in establishing secure industrial 
control systems (NIST, 2007). This guide provides a comprehensive detailed assessment on securing SCADA 
systems for the industrial sector. The guidelines suggested can be used by organisations as best practice when 
designing and configuring control system networks such as SCADA.  
Another measure initiated to improve security within SCADA systems is the development of the 
Instrumentation Systems and Automation Society (ISA) which is developing a standard ISA-SP99 for 
Manufacturing and Control Systems Security. The SP99 establishes standards, recommends practices, and 
provides technical reports and related information that will define procedures for implementing electronically 
secure manufacturing and control system practices as well as assessing security performance (Mays, 2004).  
Also, in 2005, the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC) in the UK developed a Good 
Practice Guide for process control and SCADA security with specific information on firewall deployment, and 
managing SCADA security risks (NISCC, 2005). This standard has been developed to promote effective 
SCADA security risk management and firewall deployment.  
The present author would also like to recognise and summarise other standards that are currently available for 
SCADA security. Below are just some of the many SCADA standards that are currently available. 
? NIST Systems Protection Profile Critical Infrastructure Process Control Systems (SPP-CIPS); 
? NIST SPP Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS); 
? Common Criteria ISO/IEC 15408 Version 2.1 to 3.1; 
? ISO/IEC 27002:2006 Information Technology  Security Techniques and Code of Practice for Information 
Security Management Standard; 
? NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standard CIP-002-CIP-009; 
? DOD Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation;  
? Sans Top 20. 
(USCERT, 2008)  
There is a plethora of SCADA standards overseas that can be currently used within the SCADA industry. At this 
stage it is not possible to critique every standard but in order to determine which standard should be used can be 
very challenging and complex for many organisations.  The extent of how useful these standards are for 
organisations is still questionable as vulnerabilities are continually appearing within SCADA systems. This 
suggests that the amount of information and complexity within these standards makes it challenging for 
organisations to determine what standards to follow and hence why there is need and a requirement for holistic 
SCADA standards that address SCADA security for each sector.  
Below the Australian SCADA context is discussed with a proposed holistic SCADA security standard that can 
be easily adopted by organisations that own SCADA assets.  
AUSTRALIAN SCADA INITIATIVES AND STANDARDS  
In comparison to the overseas SCADA context there has been a limited amount of Australian SCADA security 
standards been made available to Australian SCADA asset owners in order to address SCADA security 
vulnerabilities.  Alternatively, there have been various initiatives that have been developed by the Australian 
government to assist SCADA asset owners and operators.  
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The Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (TISN) is Australia’s critical 
infrastructure information sharing network that intends to allow the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure to share information on important issues relating to business continuity, consequence 
management, information system attacks and vulnerabilities, e-crime, protection of key sites from attack or 
sabotage, chemical, biological and radiological threats to water and food supplies and the identification and 
protection of offshore and maritime assets (Schneider, 2003). This network has a specific focus on SCADA and 
has several critical infrastructure advisory councils, including an IT security expert advisory board and the 
SCADA community of interest that focuses on strategies and methods to reduce SCADA vulnerability and 
threats. Figure 1.1 demonstrates how TISN focuses on protecting Australia’s critical infrastructure. In terms of 
how effective TISN is a key agency in SCADA critical infrastructure protection is still questionable as 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses are still appearing in Australian SCADA systems (TISN, 2007a). 
 
Figure 1.1 TISN and Australia’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Arrangements 
 
 
(TISN, 2007a) 
 
In 2005, an Australian initiative was developed to reduce vulnerabilities in Australian SCADA systems because 
of the lack of commitment from the private sector. The Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment Program 
(CNVA) has been developed to support the work of the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Program aims to enhance the level of protection of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure by working with critical infrastructure owners and operators to identify major vulnerabilities in 
SCADA systems and test those systems’ ability to resist exploitation (TISN, 2006).  The Program provides 
dollar for dollar funding to help owners and operators of critical infrastructure to: 
? identify major vulnerabilities within ICT systems, dependencies between networks, and to test the 
ability of systems to resist exploitation; 
? examine the security implications of planned changes to an information technology infrastructure; 
? assess associated physical and personnel security issues. 
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The CNVA Program also provides assurances to organisations that the IT infrastructure and associated policies 
and processes that are in place are appropriate for their current environment. It also provides an opportunity for 
government and business to develop strategies to ensure that critical services continue to be delivered under a 
variety of conditions and circumstances (TISN, 2006).   
Also, another initiative developed by the Australian government is GovCERT which provide plans and policies 
to protect Australia from a severe information based attack (SCADA). Its main focus is to integrate policy and 
plans together in order to prepare and protect the national information infrastructure from a cyber based attack 
or possible cyber-terrorism.  
GovCERT is responsible for: 
? liaising with CERTs from foreign government; 
? coordinating enquiries from foreign governments about cyber-security issues affecting Australian 
businesses, including critical infrastructure owners and operators; 
? coordinating the Australian Government’s policy for the National Information Infrastructure on 
how to prepare for, respond to and recover from computer emergencies, and 
? managing the Australian Government’s Computer Network Vulnerability Assessment Program, 
which provides cash grants to critical infrastructure owners and operators to undertake security 
assessments of their IT systems and networks. 
 (TISN, 2007b) 
GovCERT plays a role in coordinating SCADA related actives and provides various initiatives to assist with 
SCADA protection. This suggests that the effectiveness and usefulness of GovCERT is hard to assess, but 
believes they are providing some assistance in order to address SCADA security issues.  
Another initiative set up by the Australian government is the SCADA portal which provides an online, 
community-based environment that facilitates collaboration between government organisations, academic 
institutions and owners and operators of critical infrastructure (TISN, 2007c). The portal has recently been 
initiated in 2007 by the Australian government and TISN and is another strategy in place to improve SCADA 
security by encouraging owners of critical infrastructure to collaborate.  The present author can’t assess how 
widely and effective this portal is currently being used as this is still in early stages of development  
Lastly, the SCADA Risk Management Framework (RMF) was developed in 2006 to assist organisations in 
managing SCADA risks.   The framework is a generic high-level document that provides a cross-sector 
approach to identifying and assessing risks for owners and operators of SCADA systems. The Risk Management 
Framework can be tailored to suit a particular sector or organisation and also contains advice on how 
information security risks can be simplified and presented to senior management (TISN, 2007d). This 
framework is a measure that has been developed recently by the Australian government to manage SCADA 
security threats. The framework can be used effectively in order to conduct SCADA security risk assessments 
and workshops as well as assisting organisations in ranking SCADA security risks.  
Additional Australian Government Shortcomings for SCADA 
The Australian government and private sector have developed an information sharing network to improve 
SCADA security with the initiatives and standards mentioned above. It is unclear how effective these agencies 
and measures are working in order to reduce the vulnerability of high risk targets such as SCADA. These 
agencies and measures discussed provide an insight into the main response to SCADA security within Australia. 
These measures are only working to a certain extent in defending organisations assets from cyber-attack, 
because threats and vulnerabilities are still appearing in critical information systems such as SCADA as 
mentioned above. For example, in 2008, Australia joined the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand in the 
international cyber-exercise Cyber Storm II, held in March 2008. Around 55 organisations from the Australian 
Government, state and territory governments, the IT industry and private sector members of the Trusted 
Information Sharing Network took part in the Australian leg of the exercise (TISN, 2008b). The exercise did not 
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extend to real attacks on any security infrastructure. It did, however, operate on the premise that the ‘adversary’ 
could successfully overwhelm an organisation’s cyber-defences and it was these successful attacks that made up 
the scenarios. What was then tested was the organisation’s ability to respond to and recover from attacks (TISN, 
2008b).  
This exercise demonstrates that the Australian Government perceives a threat of an information based attack 
such as cyber-terrorism against their critical infrastructure systems. These simulation exercises are identifying 
system vulnerabilities to improve SCADA system security from potential threats such as hackers and possibly 
even cyber-terrorists. 
Such cases highlight the need for additional measures to improve the cyber-security of SCADA systems. The 
measures discussed above promote a public and private partnership model to enhance SCADA security within 
both sectors. The author suggests that specific SCADA initiatives such as TISN, GovCERT, the SCADA Risk 
Framework and the SCADA portal are useful contributions that have been set up by the Australian government 
in order to improve SCADA security. Since the development of such initiatives the SCADA community and the 
increase in SCADA security awareness has given the ability for key decision makers to integrate SCADA 
security into their overall business strategy. Public and private owners of critical SCADA utilities are now more 
widely involved in using such initiatives to improve their overall security and performance.  
These initiatives developed by the government have made some contribution in order to protect organisations 
from cyber attack. The extent of whether these standards and measures are adequate is still questionable as 
SCADA vulnerabilities and cases such as Cyber-Storm 2 suggest that continued and ongoing improvement and 
collaboration are necessary in order to achieve sustainability in this area and to maintain best industry security 
practice and standards.  
With so many SCADA standards currently available for organisations overseas can make it difficult in 
determining which standard should be used within each individual SCADA sector. Below discusses the 
requirement for a holistic SCADA standard for each critical infrastructure sector that could be applied and used 
within the Australian context.   
A PROPOSED REQUIREMENT FOR HOLISTIC SCADA STANDARDS FOR MULTIPLE SECTORS  
In order to achieve success in this challenging and complex environment action must be taken to implement a 
public and private sector relationship SCADA model that works across many specific industries.  The present 
author suggests that a holistic SCADA framework and standard could be developed that addresses different 
sectors with specific aspects for SCADA security. At present there are various SCADA standards that are being 
used including standards discussed above such as, NIST 2007, NERC, ISO, TISN SCADA Risk Framework and 
others. Although some of these standards do focus on certain sectors they don’t necessarily provide a 
comprehensive or holistic SCADA security approach. Also, there are so many different SCADA standards that 
their usefulness and practicality can be limited according to which SCADA sector the organisation belongs too. 
For example, SCADA systems in the rail sector are ultimately different from those systems used in the water 
sector. There are also different regulation guidelines and rules for each individual infrastructure and hence why 
specific SCADA frameworks would be deemed significant and necessary according to each individual sector. It 
is suggested that each standard must cover all aspects of SCADA security in relation to each industry, but with 
some commonalities.   
In terms of practicality and feasibility it would be necessary to have one holistic SCADA standard for each 
critical infrastructure sector, rather than having a plethora of SCADA standards for all cross sectors. Ultimately, 
SCADA assets owners and operators need to be able to follow and adopt a process that suits their own needs 
and requirements as well as acquiring a methodology that is viable and effective. Below is a sample of the 
proposed holistic SCADA standards concept for each sector.  
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Figure 2.1 Proposed Holistic SCADA Standards for Each Sector (Examples) 
Holistic SCADA 
Security Standard 
(GAS)
Holistic SCADA 
Security Standard 
(Water)
Holistic SCADA 
Security Standard 
(Rail)
Holistic SCADA 
Secuirty Standard 
(Power)
Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security (SP 800-82)  
ISA-SP99 for Manufacturing and Control Systems Security
Good Practice Guide for process control and SCADA security 
NIST Systems Protection Profile Critical Infrastructure Process Control Systems (SPP-CIPS)
NIST SPP Industrial Control Systems (SPP-ICS)
Common Criteria ISO/IEC 15408 Version 2.1 to 3.1
ISO/IEC 27002:2006 Information Technology  Security Techniques and Code of Practice for Information Security Management Standard
NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standard CIP-002-CIP-009
DOD Instruction 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation 
Sans Top 20
TISN SCADA Risk Management Framework (Australia)
 
Although the present author is proposing one SCADA security standard for each sector the amount of standards 
has effectively been minimised providing a single standard approach for each sector. Each standard would 
ultimately have similarities but may also provide specific details or amendments according to each individual 
sector. The proposed concept provides a process that is comprehensive, fluid and easily adoptable for many 
organisations. The use and practicality of holistic standards that are sector specific with similar commonalities is 
an attractive option that many organisations could simply follow. Current standards available don’t meet this 
requirement although they do offer some assistance in specific areas for SCADA security. The concept of 
providing an “all in one holistic SCADA security standard approach” would be a viable option for an 
organisation to adopt to assist with SCADA security that is specific to there own sector. The proposed concept 
will ultimately address various concerns within industry and provides a systematic process that is practical for 
each SCADA environment. Figure 2.1 is only a representation of some of the possible sectors that it could be 
applied to and by no means is a complete or exhaustive list. The proposed concept could be driven by industry 
with the assistance of various standards committees such as “Standards Australia (2008)” in order to create an 
effective SCADA security solution. The significance of using holistic standards for SCADA protection would 
enable organisations to follow a consistent process that is adopted by all industry sectors.   
 
CONCLUSION:  
SCADA system vulnerabilities discovered by the NSTB program and the Cyber Storm 2 exercise in 2008 have 
suggested the dangers that control systems such as SCADA are currently facing since the convergence of these 
systems with Internet. Various SCADA initiatives and SCADA standards have been developed in recent years 
both overseas and within Australia in order to address SCADA security issues. These standards maybe limited 
in providing organisations with effective and easy to follow guidelines for securing SCADA systems. This paper 
has proposed a holistic SCADA security standard that is sector specific and that provides organisations with a 
process that can be implemented relatively easily. Further research is needed in developing a holistic SCADA 
standard that is industry specific and widely accepted, ultimately providing an even greater contribution to the 
SCADA security community.  
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